Kalabagh Dam

Just another WordPress.com weblog

The Water Divide March 21, 2010

Filed under: Uncategorized — سید ہارون حیدر گیلانی @ 5:05 pm

By Massoud Ansari

Field studies for the Kalabagh Dam began in 1953. According to the plan, the dam is to be constructed at Kalabagh, a town about 120 miles downstream from the Tarbela Dam. If all goes according to plan, the reservoir created by the dam will extend into the town of Nowshera on the right bank of the river Indus in NWFP. It will also serve the administrative districts of Mianwali and Campbellpur in the Punjab and Kohat and Nowshera districts in the Frontier province.

Those in favour of the Kalabagh Dam project maintain that it will not only generate 3600 MGW of hydro-electric power, but will also provide an effective means of controlling the water used for irrigation purposes. They point out that the quantity of water stored in Tarbela and Mangla dams is decreasing because of sedimentation and maintain that an additional storage dam is urgently needed, otherwise a dream of a green revolution in the country is not sustainable.’ The dam advocates also say that its construction will help reduce the effect of floods by storing the extra water during peak flood flows.

Meanwhile, experts in Sindh believe that 1.9 million acres of thick riverine forests, 1.3 million acres of rich grazing lands and 6 lakh acres of cultivated land are entirely dependent on inundation by the river Indus. If the quantity of water flowing down the river is insufficient, then food crops, fodder and drinking water supplied from wells are adversely affected. They cite the 1985-86 drought as an example. At this time, since the Katcha area was not inundated, many families were forced to migrate to urban areas, adding to the population explosion in cities.

Another cause of concern among Sindhis is the danger that the dam would pose to the stretch of mangrove forests in the Indus delta. Spread over 65, 000 acres, they are the sixth largest mangrove forests in the world. If the dam is constructed, they will be completely destroyed. The mangrove forests are fed by nutrients carried in the silt of the river and its estuaries are rich in botanical and aquatic wildlife, especially prawn. The mangrove forests are a principle component of the delta ecosystem and any harm to them will be an immeasurable loss.

Salinity poses another threat. The flow of water of the Indus effectively checks the salt-water intrusion from the Arabian Sea to the lower flood plains of the Indus. By reversing the flow of salt water into the southern part of Sindh, the sweet water will get contaminated and will add to the salinity of the irrigated lands. The unthinkable has already happened, however. The entire coastline spread over two districts of Thatta and Badin in Sindh, have been badly affected due to non-availability of freshwater. A survey carried out by the Board of Revenue shows that unabated sea intrusion has inundated over 1.2 million acres of farmland in the eight coastal tehsils, dislocating almost a quarter million people, and inflicting financial losses of over 100 billion rupees so far.

Official estimates put the complete devastation at more than 450,000 acres of farmland in 72 dehs (villages) spread over eight tehsils in Thatta and Badin. These include six tehsils in Thatta, which are Shah Bunder, Ghora Bari, Kharo Chhan, Mirpur Sakro, Jati and Keti Bunder. Two tehsils in the Badin district – Badin and Golarchi – are now under threat of the advancing seawaters. In other 87 dehs of the same eight tehsils of two districts of Thatta and Badin, sea water intrusion has substantially damaged about 500,000 acres of land from where the population has moved away in search of food and water. Not only this, the reduced water supply to Keenjhar lake has also put at risk, the already short, fresh drinking water supply to Karachi. The survey suggests that the areas of the Keti Bandar, Shah Bandar and Kharo Chan subdivisions are the worst hit. At present people, in Keti Bandar and Kharo Chan have been bringing drinking water from Ghahro, at a distance of 15 km.

However, Sindh’s main opposition to the Kalabagh Dam is based on the years of mistrust and suspicion with which Sindh views all efforts by the Punjab and WAPDA to tap the waters of Sindh. Such apprehensions stem from past events. In 1972, the Sindh government signed the Chashma-Jhelum link canal (C.J Link Canal) agreement with the Punjab. Under the agreement, the Punjab government was allowed to take the water of Sindh after seeking permission from the Sindh chief minister. However, irrigation experts allege that Punjab had continuously stolen the waters of Sindh from the C.J Link Canal. In 1985, the year was a lean one and water was scarce in Sindh. However, the Punjab Governor, General Ghulam Gilani, and the WAPDA Chairman, Safdar Butt, flew to the C.J Link Canal and forcibly had Sindh’s water released for the Punjab. Naturally, this created a great deal of resentment. When General Gilani was told that Sindh was already facing a water crisis and it was obligatory to get the Sindh chief minister’s permission to open the canal, he retorted, “To hell with Sindh.” Sindh, therefore, questions why they should accept Punjab’s guarantees, given its dishonest past track record.

Likewise, experts in Sindh said when the Water Apportionment Accord was signed in 1991, it was agreed that the water would be released downstream of Kotri to check sea intrusion. Para 7 of the Water Accord 1991 reads, “The need for certain minimum escape to the sea, below Kotri, to check sea intrusion was recognised. Sindh held the view that the optimum level was 10 MAF, which was discussed at length, while other studies indicated lower/higher figures. It was, therefore decided that further studies would be undertaken to establish the minimal escape need downstream of Kotri.” However, these experts said, despite the fact that the sea had started intruding into agricultural lands, experts in Punjab continued to suggest that the water released into the sea was being wasted. Scientists in Sindh wanted more water released downstream, and in seasonal patterns more attuned to the ecological needs of the lower basin. “Some of the studies even suggest that at least 30 per cent of the total water generated in any river needs to be released to check the sea intrusion in the lower Indus,” said Syed Murad Ali Shah, a PPP MPA. He said, “If we calculate 30 per cent of the total water that will amount to a huge number, but even the 10 MAF that was considered in the 1991 Accord has not been released and this continues to cause havoc for the people living in Thatta and Badin districts.”

A Kalabagh expert, Ibrar Qazi, maintains that Sindh has no objection to the dam if it is constructed upstream of the Tarbela Dam: “There are other sites like the Bhasha Dam, for instance. Located at the junction of the NWFP in the northern areas, it is free from tectonic activity. It has the same storage capacity as is envisaged for the Kalabagh Dam and can generate 25 to 30 per cent more electric power than the Kalabagh Dam would. Besides this, there are the Basu, Bunji, Thakat and Patan dams, all on the river Indus. They can become medium storage dams with 5 MAF capacity. All are feasible sites for power generation.”

Other Sindhi opponents to the dam contend that Punjab’s intention is not merely to generate electricity, but to take control of Sindh’s water. “Punjab will then be able to irrigate 380,000 acres of land on both banks of the river in Mianwali, Khusab and Jhelum districts through a canal that branches out from the Indus. Additionally, another 15000 cusecs of canal water are to be tapped from the right bank of the dam to irrigate 2.12 million acres in the Khuram basin of Dera Ismail Khan,” says an expert on dams.

Kalandar Bakhsh Kalar, a former irrigation engineer from Sindh, maintains that, “Due to the location of the envisaged Kalabagh Dam, Punjab can easily steal the waters of the Indus and divert them into the desert. Punjab is not agreeable to the other six sites because they will not be as strategically beneficial to the Punjab as the Kalabagh Dam.”

Likewise, the NWFP is objecting to the dam on the grounds that when in operation, it will threaten a vast area of the land in the province through inundation, and displace a great number of people. The Attock gorge is expected to be made into a reservoir with a storage capacity of 7.9 MAF. The dam will rise to a height of 250 feet from the river belt. This will raise the water level of the Indus through the Attock gorge, through Haro all the way up to the Okara and Kabul river. Nowshera is a city where a population of approximately 2 lakhs resides on the right and left banks of the Kabul river. With the construction of the dam, downtown Nowshera will stand 24 feet below the river dykes. In the event of any weakness in the dykes, or worse yet a break, the city of Nowshera will be entirely submerged. Even apart from this worst-case scenario, with the construction of the dam, Nowshera will be in great danger of becoming waterlogged and as a result over 30,000 people, many of them poor herdsmen and boatmen, will be displaced from around the immediate vicinity of the dam. The opponents of the dam in the Frontier province also believe that the Attock-Nowshera road will be submerged by the Kalabagh Dam reservoir. Additionally, six new rail and road bridges will need to be built after the dam has been constructed. However, funds for these projects have not been included in the estimated allocation of funds for the Kalabagh Dam. Furthermore, project opponents say that the Mardan Salinity Control and Rehabilitation Project (SCARP) will be severely affected by the dam, as the SCARP drainage level will be lower than the upper level of the Kalabagh Dam reservoir.

And that is not all. Article 161 (2) of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan states that, “the province in which a hydro-electricity project is situated will get the net profit of the power generated.” In the case of the Kalabagh Dam, the reservoir area is situated in the NWFP whereas the power station is located in the Punjab. Thus, NWFP experts believe that the Punjab will receive the profit from power generation, while the NWFP will inherit the problems. The province of Balochistan is not riparian in the strictest sense, but the Pat Feeder canal from the Guddu barrage carries 3400 cusecs of water to irrigate about 3 lakh acres in the province. Balochistan recently requested the Sindh government to remodel the Pat Feeder canal in order to increase the flow to 6000 cusecs to make it possible to irrigate another 2 lakh acres. Hence, its opposition to the Kalabagh Dam is based on the apprehension that any future request to the Sindh government for more water from the Indus will meet with little success if the dam is constructed over the Indus, which can itself be deprived of its required share of water.

Though there are many valid reasons against the construction of the dam, both WAPDA and the President argue in favour of the Kalabagh Dam and still suggest that it is the only solution to meet the oncoming water shortage. They believe that it is a highly feasible site: it is only the name that has become controversial. However, Sindh’s politicians assert that they would not accept the construction of the dam even if it were named the “Madina Dam.” President Musharraf, meanwhile, argues that the Kalabagh Dam feasibility report is already there and they would need at least another three to four years to carry out feasibilities for other sites for water reservoirs. Musharraf also maintains that water accumulates in the river Indus not only from the glaciers of the Himalayas, but also through the monsoons. “If we construct a dam upstream of Tarbela, the country can still lose huge amounts of monsoon water which is collected at the site of Kalabagh,” he pointed out.

However, all the opposition parties in the country believe that no water reservoir is more important than the country itself. “The project that is to divide the nation has to be shelved,” Shahbaz Sharif, the Pakistan Muslim League leader, who has remained one of the main proponents of the Kalabagh Dam in the past, told a press conference. “Kalabagh is a dead horse, it would not be of any use if they try to revive it,” says the PPP’s Makhdoom Amin Fahim. “This is not only an issue of life and death for the people, but it has now become an issue of life and death for the country.

 

The importance of Kalabagh Dam

Filed under: Uncategorized — سید ہارون حیدر گیلانی @ 11:10 am

By the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over six million acre feet

From SHAMIM AHMED RIZVI, Islamabad
Jul 24 – 30, 2000

The Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf initiated the process of developing a national consensus on the construction of Kalabagh Dam when he personally presented before a gathering of Sindh newspapers editors, generally hostile to the dam, how important it was for the national economy to start work on the dam and how any further delay in its construction would be an invitation to a disaster for the country in the near future.

Sponsored by: The Vision Foods

The Chief Executive warned against the perils of depleting water reservoirs and the need for construction of not only Kalabagh Dam but many other dams to meet the future water requirements of the country specially of the Sindh Province. Pointing out that our existing dams are depleting, Gen. Musharraf informed the editors of Daily Sindhi Newspaper coming out from Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur that by the year 2009 or 2010 Pakistan will have a water short fall of over six million acre feet which is equal to water stored in Mangla Dam and this shortage will continue to increase with every passing year and the biggest sufferer will be the province of Sindh. He said the depleting capacity of the existing water reservoirs call for at least one dam like Kalabagh, Bhasha or Bunji every 10 years. We have been neglecting this dire requirement and did not construct any new dam during the last 30 years and the country is today suffering for this criminal neglect in the form of drought and acute water shortage throughout the country specially Sindh and Balochistan. He explained that Punjab Province has plenty of sweet sub soil water and in case of shortage it can meet its requirement by sinking more tubwells. But Sindh has brackish sub soil water which cannot be used for irrigation purposes. The water shortage in province will be much more acute in the coming years and this disaster can be averted only by undertaking construction of new dams on warfooting, he added.

General Pervez Musharraf was right when he said that big dams take a long time to build, and that even the feasibility study for a major dam can take several years. He was also right when he said that Pakistan urgently needs to build more dams to boost the country’s water-storage capacity, citing the example of Turkey which has built 40 dams on the Tigris River and other rivers over the last five decades, while Pakistan, during the same period, has built only two. Mangla Dam on the River of Jhelum (completed in 1968) and Tarbela Dam on the River Indus (completed in 1974). He said “If we take a decision right now to go ahead with the construction of a dam, it will be completed in the year 2010, by which time the water shortage in the country will rise to 6 million acre-feet, and by the year 2014 or 2015 the shortage will go up to 8 million to 10 million acre-feet. “Would it not be stupidity if we keep losing our water and our people keep longing for it. Do we want to give our people a concept that they should go on longing for water,” Gen. Musharraf rightly posed a question.

The feasibility study of Kalabagh Dam was prepared long ago and lot of preliminary work has already been done on the project. Its construction can be started in few months hoping to complete it by 2009/2010. In the meanwhile work on feasibilities of Bhasha and Nunji should be taken in hand with a plan of action to start work on these two dams in 2005, and 2010 and completing by 2015 and 2020 respectively. If we want to meet the water requirements of next fifty years, we will have to build all these dams besides identifying new sites, he added.

The Kalabagh Dam has become an absolute necessity for the country and delaying or abandoning its construction would be an invitation to a disaster. The water situation has become precarious and the provinces are going to each other throat over the issue of water supply. Pakistan is one of the unfortunate country which has not built a major dam in the last three decades. No wonder, today the country is facing a serious water crisis. Millions and millions of rupees have been spent on the feasibility report of the Dam, alterations have been made in the plan to remove the apprehensions of those who have opposed it for one reason or the other, but all these have proved futile exercises and the project has not moved an inch forward. The unnecessary politicisation of the issue has been the major hurdle. However, it would be advisable for the Chief Executive to allay the genuine fears, if any, of the critics of the Dam. It would be suicidal to let the Dam become victim of a political controversy. Those who are using the issue as a political ploy to do politicking are advised not to do so as it amounts to playing with the destiny of the country. The government would not find it easy to build up a consensus on the issue. They need to muster support of politicians who matter. And it would require patience, imagination, good sense and finally power of persuasion. It is good that the Chief Executive has already initiated a process of dialogue with the politicians. The governors should also become a part of it at their level. Secondly, the opponents of the project have become allergic to the name of Kalabagh Dam. There is a lot of merit in Imran Khan’s suggestion to change the name of the Dam to Indus Channel. Apparently this may appear a gimmick, but surrounded by a peculiar political controversy as Kalabagh Dam is, this gimmick may deliver, as it could provide a way out to those staunch opponents who had gone too far in their opposition of Kalabagh Dam, but would accept it if given another nomenclature.

Alternatively let a national conference of all our leading water and power experts be called by the Chief Executive. Let the experts go over every aspect of the proposed dam and let them arrive at a clear decisions: yes or no. The deliberations of this conference should be held away from the glare of publicity so that there is no playing to the gallery. After the experts arrive at a decision it should be presented to the government and made public at the same time. And then let us have the wisdom and courage to abide by the considered opinion of the experts. If they conclude that the Kalabagh Dam is imperative for the good of the country, then work on the project should begin without the fear of any adverse reaction. If, on the other hand, the experts deliver a negative answer, let the feasibility study be buried without any tears being shed over it. Further shilly-shallying on this issue we cannot afford. Let us get a clear answer and then stick to it.

It would be a great achievement of Gen. Pervez Musharraf and his colleagues if they could make a breakthrough on this explosive issue. If they do it, they would not only carve out a name for themselves in the history of the country, but also win the abiding gratitude of the nation.

Link: http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue2000/issue30/i&e2.htm

 

Infeasibility of the Kalabagh Dam

Filed under: feasibility report of kalabagh dam — سید ہارون حیدر گیلانی @ 10:47 am

By Fateh Ullah Khan

The funny claim of Wapda that Kalabagh Dam is one of the most extensively studied projects in the world is totally refuted by more than 26 excerpts in the dam’s own feasibility report prepared by the project consultants.

On the contrary, the dam is the most canvassed and publicized project in the world for which a forced consensus is being sought politically in spite of its technical infeasibility. Moreover, Wapda falsely claims that its design is well-documented and be accepted by its critics.

The most amusing design aspect of Kalabagh is that its “restricted mid-level sluicing” design concept dictated by Wapda in terms of reference (TOR) is formally declared as unwanted by the consultants. They have recommended to adopt unrestricted “low level sluicing design.”

The consultants have given their honest opinion by disagreeing with its client (Wapda) stating that there is no specific method to sluice silt except “the lower the draw down level, the longer this level is maintained and the higher the flows then the more effective the sluicing will be”. For proof, reference may be made to the dam KBD) main project report June 1988, page 3.8 para 3.27. The excerpt from the feasibility report is given below.

“In principle there is no specific mode of operation that must be adhered to each year in order to sluice sediment from Kalabagh but the lower the draw-down level, the longer this level is maintained and the higher the flows then the more effective the sluicing will be.”

The above excerpt if technically decoded clearly suggests a barrage type structure with unrestricted low-level sluices rather than a dam with mid-level sluicing structure. Attention is again invited to another very important excerpt from the KBD Project Report 1988 page 3.5, para 3.17. It states: -

“The high sediment load carried by the Indus at Kalabagh has an important bearing on the design of Kalabagh and on the operation rules for the Reservoir. If a high proportion of sediment is trapped the storage volume will rapidly reduce with the loss of irrigation benefits derived from storage. Such sedimentation could eventually also cause unacceptable back-water effects”

This excerpt clearly means that heavy silt load carried by the Indus at Kalabagh plays vital role in selecting the type of hydraulic design for the KBD so as to avoid rapid silting, loss of storage and backwater flooding beside loss of irrigation benefits. The above excerpt therefore confirms to adopt low-level unrestricted sluicing design to cater for the evacuation of heavy and rapid silting in the Kalabagh Reservoir as the hydraulic design has an important bearing on the project and on its life span and service value. There is yet another excerpt from the main project report 1988, page 3.8 para 3.27 which states: -

“However, although drawdown is required for irrigation benefits, the lower the draw down level and the longer the sluicing period, the greater is the loss of power and energy generation”.

For further proof of its infeasibility, refer to the KBD’s project report June 1988, page 3.9 para 3.31, which states: -

“Chas T. Main etc considered special low-level sluices to achieve very low drawdown. In that case power generation must be discontinued. Thus economic Penalty is large”. The above excerpts indicate that the KBD is neither beneficial for irrigation nor for power generation. It also shows that Kalabagh is not the suitable site for a storage dam as prefixed by WAPDA in the TOR for the consultants. It may be investigated for a barrage.

Implications: Refer to the KBD main report page 4.11 para 4.55 which emphasizes that heavy silting will take place in the 3.5 maf Attock portion of the KBD reservoir against the heavy inflow of about 90 maf of water. As KBD reservoir has the poorest CI ratio in the world, therefore it will rapidly silt up as Tarbela is fast losing its silt trap efficiency after performing 30 years of service.

The muddy Kabul River is also contributing about 110 million tons of silt equal to 0.1 maf annually in addition to 0.2 maf of silt flow from Tarbela Reservoir. Besides all above, the lurking danger of the liquefaction of 200 feet high and about 60 Km long silt island in Tarbela Reservoir would be a potential catastrophe for a down stream storage dam.

The selection and fixation of reservoir site by Wapda with the poorest CI ratio is a great mistake, as it will rapidly silt up. This is why the Kalabagh consultants have shown great concern of rapid silting in the main project report on page 3.5 para 3.17, page 4.12 para 4.57.and page 3.9 para 3.31. Few relevant excerpts are quoted below: -

I. “Upstream of Attock the flood level are sensitive to the amount of sediment so that flood risk will increase with time”.

ii. “The future distribution of sediment can be predicted in general terms only and local behaviour will depend on actual sediment inflows, reservoir operation and local flow pattern”.

iii. “No immediate solution for sediment management seems to be practically viable”.

iv. “The high sediment load carried by the Indus at Kalabagh has an important bearing on the design of Kalabagh Dam and on the operation rules of the reservoir.”

v. “In the long run the generation of power will be on run-of-river”.

The above excerpts show that the dam is a very short lived project due to rapid silting like the original Sanmenxia Dam in China that was built with mid-level sluicing design and failed with in two years of its construction due to rapid silting and backwater flooding. The Chinese then rebuilt it with low level sluicing design and now its working is perfect. For proof refers to Water Supply and Management, November 5 No: 4/5 pp 351 to 361 of 1981 by Long Yuqian and Zhang Qishun.

The Chinese paper on page 357 supports the unrestricted low level sluicing design concept of the Kalabagh consultants by stating that ” the sediment should only be sluiced off the reservoir by lowering the water stage during large floods. The amount of sediment sluiced from the reservoir depends upon the discharge, slope and the duration of flow.”

It is surprising that Wapda has instructed the project consultants in the TOR to provide mid-level sluicing design specifically pre-selecting Kalabagh site for the dam so as to create a storage of 9.5 maf at El: 925 with free board at 940. These were the preconditions for the consultants in the TOR. They were not allowed to select a better dam site on the main stem of the Indus River where there is potential for the storage of about 80 maf of water and 40,000 MW of power generation.

These unusual and formidable conditions imposed on the consultants in the TOR by Wapda were kept secret from NWFP as it was flooding Peshawar valley and blocking its sub-surface drainage besides blocking the gateway to NWFP by imposing a wrong design. For confirmation refer to the KBD project report volume N, appendix N. An excerpt from the project report is quoted below: -

Basically design criteria were set during the initial appraisal of the scheme and development outline design. These were based on the requirements of the client through the terms of reference (TOR) or subsequent instructions.”

The said instructions in the TOR seriously endangered the whole of Peshawar valley. The proof lies in the fact that the project provided 30 feet high flood protection embankments around Nowshera town, Nowshera cantonment, Akhora Khattak town and other important towns in the valley.

It also affected about 250,000 people as estimated in 1980 besides affecting 180,000 acres of land. Refer to project report volume IX, appendix. U, pages U8 to U10. Also refer to the KBD project report June 1991 page 3.35 and page 15. Again to KBD Executive Summary December 1994, page 23 and to KBD Backwater studies page 6.

On account of the above reasons, the Irsa rejected the hydraulic design of Kalabagh Dam under the Irsa Act with 4:1 majority on 22.10.1996, as the project’s hydraulic design was infeasible in the light of para 6 of the Water Accord. After the rejection, Wapda did not file an appeal to the CCI against the decision of Irsa.

The project consultants have clearly established in the feasibility report the design criteria of “low level sluicing” for silt evacuation. Refer to KBD project main report pages 3.5, 3.8 and 3.9. Therefore the design criteria suggested by the project consultants to WAPDA is:

The lower the draw down level, the longer this level is maintained, and the higher the flows then more effective the sluicing will be.”

Most unfortunately, Wapda did not agree to accept the design criteria suggested by the KBD project consultants. Wapda argued that in that case storage will be reduced and also the hydropower generation. WAPDA preferred to ignore the very short life span of the dam due to rapid silting, its adverse consequences of water shortage for irrigated agriculture, the flooding of Peshawar valley besides wastage of about $ 8 billion as the cost of the project.

Moreover, there will be a delay of another 25 years for the construction of a new dam on the main stem of the Indus. Surprisingly, Wapda’s second priority is the 3.3 maf Akhori Dam an off-channel reservoir already rejected by the World Bank team due to serious foundation problems. Refer to Dr Pieter Lieftnick report Vol:-I pages 269 and 292.

My suggestion to Wapda for the KBD was to adopt, “low level unrestricted sluices with high flows for longer duration.” This criteria was suggested for the reasons that the bed level of the Indus River was being flattened by 145 feet (825-680) by the construction of mid-level sluicing Kalabagh Dam that would also block river flow to create storage. As a result, this will slow down the velocity flow on the up stream and drastically reduce stream power.

This will kill the effective silt carrying power of the flow with the result that silt will drop in the wide Attock portion of Kalabagh reservoir. Besides this, the duration of flow is reduced to 50 days. Moreover, another most vital factor to carry silt is of “high flows” that is essentially required to push and evacuate silt.

But this force too is drastically reduced after the diversion of 56500 cusecs of silt free water into Ghazi Barotha Power Channel and dropping its silt in Ghazi barrage pond for deposition at Attock. All silt evacuating factors like steeper slope, high discharge, long duration of flow and unrestricted sluicing at low-level are not available.

However, Wapda can built a low level unrestricted sluicing structure like barrage at the Kalabagh on emergency basis to meet water shortage and to act as balancing reservoir for adjusting and balancing irrigation and water needs. This structure will function like Chashma barrage and will have no silt problem.

Poor power generation: Wapda has falsely shown that power generation from the dam is initially 2400 MW. Actually it is only 350 MW as reported by Dr Pieter Lieftnick in Volume-I of his report. The basic reasons for low power generation are the mid-level sluicing design and the unsuitable site for the dam with the poorest CI ratio in the world. The adoption of wrong sluicing design requires emptying and refilling of the reservoir that takes about four months in a vague attempt to desilt the reservoir.

This reduces power generation by one third to1600 MW. Again, without bringing any change in the hydraulic design, the reservoir retention level for the purpose of reservoir operation is reduced from El: 925 to 915 by 10 feet in a vague attempt to avoid backwater flow and flooding in the Kabul River. This further brings down power generation to 1350 MW.

As a result of wrong mid-level sluicing design giving very low power, Wapda has adopted a cheating method by installing 1000 MW of Thermal power plant attached to the dam to support low hydropower generation from the dam. The actual power generation from the dam therefore comes to 350 MW as worked out by Dr Pieter Lieftnick. Moreover, it is further planned to double the Thermal power to 2000 MW simply to show that the dam produces power. For proof refer to the following:

1. The KBD Executive Summary, December 1984 page 28 and Exhibit-II. The construction cost of thermal station is shown.

2. The KBD Project Report June 1988, pages 4.4, 4.5 and 4.8. This excerpt reveals “The station will operate as a source of base load with Thermal power plant providing additional peak time power as required. Thermal plant will then be used to supplement the hydro-based energy to satisfy the load demand pattern.

3. The KBD main report page 4.8, paras 4.39, 4.4 and 4.1 which states that “Four 500 MW low cost Thermal plant unit have been programmed as shown on diagram No: 10 of the KBD main report.

4. The KBD project report Executive Summary October 1988, pages 41 to 45 ” Backwater studies” by Binnie and Partners, Harza, PCR, NES PAK and ACE.

5. The KBD main report pages 42, 43 and 44 besides the report of Dr Pieter Lieftnick.

The writer is former Chairman of Irsa

Linke: http://www.pakissan.com/english/watercrisis/infeasibility.of.the.kalabagh.dam.shtml

 

Hello world!

Filed under: Uncategorized — سید ہارون حیدر گیلانی @ 9:12 am

Welcome to WordPress.com. This is your first post. Edit or delete it and start blogging!

 

 
Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.